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ABSTRACT 
 
There are very few less contentious issues than the assertion that attachment 
plays a role in psychotherapy.  Concepts such as the therapeutic alliance 
speak directly to the importance of activating the attachment system, normally 
in relation to the therapist in individual therapy and in relation to other family 
members in family based intervention, if therapeutic progress is to be made.  
In group therapy the attachment process may be activated by group 
membership.  The past decade of neuroscientific research has helped us to 
understand some key processes which attachment entails at brain level.  The 
paper will outline this progress and link it to recent findings on the relationship 
between the neural systems underpinning attachment and other processes 
such as making social judgements, theory of mind, access to long term 
memory.  These findings allow intriguing speculations currently undergoing 
empirical tests on the neural basis of individual differences in attachment as 
well as the nature of psychological disturbances associated with profound 
disturbances of the attachment system.Crucial to this paper, we will explore 
the paradoxical brain state created by psychotherapy with powerful clinical 
implications for the maximisation of therapeutic benefit from the talking cure. 
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Overview 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a complex and serious mental 
disorder that is characterized by a pervasive pattern of difficulties with 
emotion regulation, impulse control, and instability both in relationships and in 
self-image with a mortality rate, associated with suicide, that is 50 times that 
of the general population (Skodol, Gunderson, Pfohl et al., 2002).1 The 
dysfunction of self-regulation is particularly apparent in the context of social 
relationships (e.g.Posner et al., 2002). 
The regulation of emotion and the catastrophic reaction to the loss of 
intensely emotionally invested social ties together place borderline personality 
disorder in the domain of attachment. A number of theorists have drawn on 
Bowlby’s ideas in explanation of borderline pathology (Holmes, 2003). 
Gunderson (1996) carefully described typical patterns of borderline 
dysfunction in terms of exaggerated reactions of the insecurely attached 
infant, for example clinging, fearfulness about dependency needs, terror of 
abandonment, constant monitoring of the proximity of the caregiver.  Lyons-
Ruth (1999) focused on the disorganisation of the attachment system in 
infancy as predisposing to later borderline pathology.  Crittenden (1997) has 
incorporated in her representation of adult attachment disorganisation the 
specific style of borderline individuals deeply ambivalent and fearful of close 
relationships.  We (Fonagy, Target, & Gergely, 2000) have also used the 
framework of attachment theory but emphasise the role of attachment in the 
development of symbolic function and the way in which insecure disorganised 
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 A more fully referenced version of this paper is available from the authors on request. 
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attachment may generate vulnerability in the face of further turmoil and 
challenges. 
Further support for the central role of attachment in the disorder comes 
from the evidence that psychotherapy is the most effective treatment modality 
although pharmacotherapy may enhance its effects. However the mechanism 
of change remains unknown. Given the strong suggestion of abnormal 
(disorganized) attachment processes and the consequent instability in 
emotions and relationships in BPD, we suggest that the mechanism mediating 
change is indeed via the improved regulation of neuropsychological systems 
underpinning the organization of interpersonal relationships (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2004).  
Mechanisms of change: causing change in causal mechanisms 
Discussing the therapeutic action of psychotherapy with BPD assumes 
that psychotherapy is indeed therapeutic. While evidence for this claim is 
gradually accumulating (Roth & Fonagy, 2005) we do not know how 
psychotherapy effects change and given the relatively rapid rate of 
spontaneous improvement (Zanarini, Frankenburg, Hennen, & Silk, 2003) in 
BPD, the observations of symptomatic improvements in uncontrolled studies 
should be considered with great caution. If we were to start from first 
principles, an understanding about the processes underpinning 
psychopathology would inform treatment innovation, which in turn would then 
be subject to empirical investigation. Kazdin (2004) has outlined a radical and 
rigorous programme for psychotherapy research based on these principles. 
The first stage follows from the proposition that treatment should reflect what 
we know about the processes that directly bear on the onset and course of a 
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clinical problem. In Kazdin’s model, demonstrating that a specific process was 
present in a sizeable proportion of individuals with a specific presentation 
would be the basis of treatment development. Further, rather than assuming 
that all individuals with the same presentation would be equally responsive to 
treatment, further work would aim to detect subtypes of a dysfunction, multiple 
pathways to the same presentation, as well as risk and protective factors. The 
second step asks questions about the processes by which a treatment 
method achieves change firstly by specifying the processes or factors 
responsible for change, then developing measures of these processes and 
finally showing that these processes change before therapeutic change 
occurs. On this basis manualization becomes feasible, on the presumption 
that the manual now includes a high dosage of ‘effective’ ingredients. 
Evaluation of outcome can then follow, along with process-outcome studies 
that aim to examine moderator variables (helping us to discover more about 
what actually does work for whom).   
Following Kazdin’s proposal we shall first consider a comprehensive 
model of biological and psychosocial factors that come together in BPD. Each 
of the components and the evidence associated with dysfunction in the 
domains specified will be outlined. Secondly we will consider how the 
therapeutic technique we favour, mentalisation based treatment (MBT), links 
to components of the proposed mechanisms underlying the pathology of BPD. 
Finally we offer preliminary (inevitably somewhat speculative) ideas as to how 
psychotherapeutic intervention might be seen to address these dysfunctions. 
In so doing we consider psychotherapy more broadly than our own approach 
as it is inherently unlikely that specific mechanisms exist for each of the 
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therapeutic models apparently relatively successfully used in this clinical 
context.  
BPD as a deficit in attachment related mentalisation 
Our view of BPD and attachment has undergone a number of changes 
as a result of accumulating data. Fifteen years ago we suggested that a better 
understanding of the features of borderline personality disorder could be 
achieved if we assumed that patients with this diagnosis had a limited 
capacity to mentalize, that is, to comprehend and use their knowledge of their 
own and others’ states of mind (Fonagy, 1989). Our original theory of 
mentalisation dysfunction suggested that the apparent inability to process 
mental states effectively and appropriately in an attachment context was a 
defensive reaction to physical or sexual abuse leading to a de-coupling of 
mental processes underpinning thinking about feelings and thoughts in self 
and others (Fonagy, 1991).  Later on we added that constitutional factors 
were also likely to be involved (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). 
Building on accumulating evidence from developmental 
psychopathology, the mentalisation theory of borderline personality disorder 
suggests that individuals either constitutionally vulnerable (Torgersen et al., 
2000) and/or exposed to neglect in early relationships (Battle et al., 2004) 
where their emotional experience is not adequately mirrored by the caregiver 
(Crandell, Patrick, & Hobson, 2003), develop with an enfeebled or fragile 
capacity to represent affect and effortfully control their attentional capacities 
(Posner et al., 2002).  These individuals when confronted with trauma (Battle 
et al., 2004) are more likely to react by decoupling their capacity to deal with 
their own or others’ mental states comprehensively, particularly in an 
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attachment context (Fonagy et al., 1996).  We may think of this as an adaptive 
decoupling, a deliberate avoidance of the state of mind of the perpetrator of 
maltreatment.  The child cannot be expected to take fully on board what must 
be the frankly hostile intentional stance of the abuser.  It may be easier not to 
think about mental states as a whole.  There may be more to this than an 
adaptation.  Early trauma may cause changes in the neural mechanisms of 
arousal which lead to a relatively ready triggering of the arousal system 
underpinning posterior cortical activation while taking the frontal mentalising 
parts of the brain ‘offline’ in response to relatively mild emotional stimuli 
(Arnsten, 1998).   
Whatever the immediate cause of the decoupling, its consequence is 
the re-emergence of modes of thinking about internal states that antedate the 
fully-fledged mentalising capacity of the adult.  In previous work we discussed 
three of these that we claim are relatively readily observable in typical 
patterns of thinking of individuals with BPD: the psychic equivalent, the 
pretend and the teleological mode of representing the internal world (Fonagy, 
Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002).  All these are modes of representing 
subjectivity that developmentally antedate the emergence of full mentalization 
(Gopnik, 1993; Flavell & Miller, 1998) Children of two or three years of age 
tend to assume a direct correspondence between what is in their mind and 
what is physically true.  A small child’s unshakable belief that there is a tiger 
under the bed is an example of psychic equivalence.  At other times children 
can contemplate an internal reality as long as no connection is made to the 
real world, as in early pretend play.  While psychic equivalence makes 
subjective experience too real, the pretend mode severs its connection with 
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reality and at an extreme it is tantamount to dissociation.  Finally the 
teleological mode refers to a unique dependence on what is observable in 
thinking about intentions.  Often individuals with BPD seek proof in physical 
action as part of a full confirmation of a subjective state.  For example one is 
being loved only if one is physically touched. 
Within our theoretical frame of reference, dysfunctional attachment 
relationships are not just the consequence of the difficulty in holding a stable 
and consistent representation of others’ and one’s own mind in mind (Liotti, 
2002), but also cause developmental distortions in self-organisation.. We 
have suggested a model that might explain this striking sequence.  
Representations of emotions cannot emerge without interaction with another 
person who mirrors the infant’s experience and whose reflections of this 
experience are internalised by the infant.  When the caregiver’s mirroring is 
not congruent, the infant organises internal experience by internalising the 
caregiver, rather than the caregiver mirroring the child (as suggested by 
Winnicott, 1956).  Thus such second-order representations of internal states 
are by definition ‘alien’.  They do not match the constitutional state of the self.  
Consequently the self-organisation will evolve in a somewhat flawed manner.  
A further factor, namely trauma, contributes to the foregrounding of 
self-fragmentation (identity diffusion) in BPD. We suggest that traumatised 
individuals can use discontinuities within the self, in other words the alien 
parts of the self, to adapt to incomprehensible assault from someone 
connected to them by attachment bonds by ‘identifying with the aggressor’ 
(Freud, 1936). The tragic consequence of this manner of self-protection is the 
modification of self-organisation so that the self now incorporates the abusive 
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intention. This generates momentary experiences of unbearable psychic pain 
when the self feels attacked literally from within and almost overwhelmed by 
an experience of ‘badness’ that is hardly mitigated by reassurance. 
Experienced in the mode of psychic equivalence the feeling of badness 
translates directly into ‘actual badness’ from which self-destruction might 
appear the only escape. In our view, this state is commonly the trigger for acts 
of self-harm and suicide. 
In summary we are proposing that a constitutionally vulnerable 
individual who experiences developmental trauma in an attachment context 
becomes psychologically vulnerable in later attachment contexts as a result of 
instability of the self. In an attempt to cope the individual decouples their mind 
from others minds and relies on earlier psychological mechanisms to organise 
the experience and in doing so reveals fragments of the self.  
If our suggestions are correct the enhancement of mentalisation and 
the reduction of the predominance of non-mentalising modes of experiencing 
internal reality represent the path to cure.   
The nature of the therapeutic intervention and the process of change 
While there have been several attempts to describe mentalisation 
focused therapy from a psychoanalytic standpoint for children (e.g. Bleiberg, 
Fonagy, & Target, 1997) and adults (e.g. Fonagy et al., 2002), the first 
comprehensive description of the therapeutic approach is to be found in 
Bateman and Fonagy’s description of the partial hospital based treatment of 
BPD (see Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). There is limited but good quality 
evidence for the effectiveness of the approach (Bateman & Fonagy, 1999, 
2001, 2003) with further studies under way.  We believe that psychotherapy 
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has the potential to recreate an interactional matrix of attachments in which 
mentalization develops and flourishes. The therapist’s mentalizing in a way 
that fosters the patient’s mentalizing is seen as a critical facet of the 
therapeutic relationship and the essence of the mechanism of change. The 
crux of the value of psychotherapy is the experience of another human being 
having the patient’s mind in mind.  
The key features of this psychotherapeutic approach may be 
summarised as follows: (1) The therapist is asked exclusively to focus on 
patients’ current mental state (their thoughts, feelings, wishes and desires) 
with the aim of building up representations of internal states, (2) They are 
asked to avoid situations where patient talks of mental states that they cannot 
link to subjectively felt reality. Thus there is deviation from traditional 
psychodynamic technique in that (a) there is a de-emphasis of ‘deep’ 
unconscious concerns in favour of conscious or near conscious content and 
less focus on past as it is represented in the present,(b) the aim of therapy is 
not insight but the recovery of mentalization: achieving representational 
coherence and integration for intentional states, (c)therapists avoid describing 
complex mental states (such as conflict, ambivalence, unconscious) and are 
asked to make “small interpretations” referring to ideation that is only slightly 
beyond the boundaries of the patient’s conscious thinking; (3) In this way the 
therapy creates a transitional area of relatedness where thoughts and 
emotions can be “played with”; (4) The inevitable enactments over the course 
of the treatment are not interpreted or understood in terms of their 
unconscious meaning but in terms of the situation and affects immediately 
prior to the enactment.  For a fuller discussion of the key features of MBT and 
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its similarities and differences from other therapeutic approaches see 
Bateman and Fonagy (2004). 
The biological basis of therapeutic change in MBT 
The role of neuroscience in psychological therapies 
Returning to our original contention that change results from 
improvement in regulation of neuropsychological systems, we must consider 
the biological basis of the change caused by the therapeutic approach 
outlined above. Although BPD is one of the most investigated of the PDs, its 
neurobiological basis is relatively unknown even though research is rapidly 
identifying neural correlates of complex subjective states (Adolphs, 2003), for 
example concern about the mental states of another person (Frith & Frith, 
2003).  Natural recovery from BPD (Zanarini et al., 2003), sometimes 
dramatic (Gunderson et al., 2003) and substantial treatment related 
improvements (e.g. Linehan et al., 2002) suggest that the psychoneurobiology 
of BPD should relate to a reversible brain state rather than permanent 
abnormalities or alterations of function. 
On the basis of the key dysfunctions of BPD, namely impulsivity and 
interpersonal problems, there are two regions of brain function which link 
together psychological processes of particular relevance to psychotherapy for 
BPD and biological processes: (a) reward circuits and attachment and (b) 
dysfunctions of interpersonal relatedness and mentalisation. We shall briefly 
consider knowledge in these areas in turn and consider the links between 
them. 
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The biology of reward and attachment 
Our suggestion is that the poor functioning of the reward system in 
individuals with BPD is linked to the dysfunction of the attachment system by 
their shared neural basis. Individuals with BPD make ‘impulsive choices’ that 
result in appetitive reward in the short term, but which have the potential to be 
self-damaging in the long run. Examples of this include gambling, 
irresponsible spending, binge eating, substance abuse, unsafe sex, and 
reckless driving.  These impulsive choices all require the individual to assign 
greater value to immediate, short-term reward than to long-term rewards like 
safety and security. We may think of this kind of impulsivity as characterized 
by actions that are poorly conceived and prematurely expressed (Daruna & 
Barnes, 1993).  
The simplest analogues of this type of impulsive behavior have been 
investigated within laboratory studies (Rogers et al., 1999). Individuals with 
BPD make poor estimations of likely outcomes in estimating the likelihood of 
monetary reward (Bazanis et al., 2002). The pattern of maladaptive 
performance was similar to individuals with focal lesions to the orbitofrontal 
cortex (Rogers et al., 1999), a region previously associated with reward 
anticipation and valuation. A further study showed BPD patients choose short-
delay small rewards over longer-delay, larger rewards (Dougherty, Bjork, 
Huckabee, Moeller, & Swann, 1999). Recent animal work implicates the 
nucleus accumbens (Nac) in temporal bias toward short-term over long-term 
rewards (Cardinal, Pennicott, Sugathapala, Robbins, & Everitt, 2001). This, 
combined with the dopaminergic reward system of the Nac being implicated in 
an animal model of impulsivity suggest that the Nac specifically and the 
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mesencephalic dopaminergic reward system (MDRS) in general may be 
involved in bias toward short-term reward, and may be characteristic of the 
maladaptive valuation and decision-making of individuals with BPD.     
The mesencephalic dopaminergic reward system has also been 
implicated in the process of drug addiction and the neurobiology of 
attachment. The pathway of interest includes the ventral tegmental area 
(VTA) that projects directly and indirectly via the amygdala/bed nucleus of the 
stria terminalis to the nucleus accumbens. From here projections are to the 
ventral pallidum and from there to the thalamus. The thalamic projections go 
to the prefrontal and cingulate cortex which are thought to activate cells that 
ultimately feedback to the VTA (Everitt & Wolf, 2002).  It appears that, broadly 
speaking, drugs that lead to dopamine release in this system, such as 
psychostimulants, are addictive (Koob & Le Moal, 1997) although the 
neurochemical basis of addiction and substance use is probably more 
complicated than dopamine release (Insel, 2003). Given that it is unlikely that 
nature created a brain system specifically to serve drug and alcohol abuse, it 
seems most likely that addiction is the accidental by-product of the activation 
of a biological system which plays a crucial evolutionary function. MacLean 
(1990) speculated that substance abuse and drug addiction were attempts to 
replace opiates or endogenous factors normally provided by social 
attachments. Similarly, Panksepp (1998) suggested a common neurobiology 
to mother–infant, infant–mother, and male–female attachment relationships 
linked to the mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic reward circuit. More recently, 
Insel (2003) summarised relevant data that seems to answer in the affirmative 
the question: “Is social attachment an addictive disorder?”  
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There is good evidence, reviewed by Insel (2003) that 
mesocorticolimbic pathways also mediate mother–infant interactions in rats: 
(a) dopamine is released and c-Fos (a proto-oncogene that encodes a 55,000 
mol. wt phosphoprotein, Fos, which is thought to assist in the regulation of 
"target genes" containing an AP-1 binding site) is activated in the nucleus 
accumbens when maternal females are exposed to their pups (Stack, 
Balakrishnan, Numan, & Numan, 2002); (b) lesions of the VTA and the 
nucleus accumbens will reduce the females’ approach and interaction with 
pups (Lee, Li, Watchus, & Fleming, 1999); (c) cocaine or c-flupenthixol (a 
non-specific dopamine antagonist) injected directly into the nucleus 
accumbens causes a decrease in pup retrieval (Vernotica, Rosenblatt, & 
Morrell, 1999); (d) Insel and his group demonstrated that the neuropeptides 
oxytocin (OT) and vasopressin (AVP) are released by socio-sexual 
experience and may serve as an important link by which parturition, 
copulation,  and lactation can activate this reward circuit leading to the 
suggestion that OT and AVP activity mark the generic reward states as 
specifically attachment-related (Young, Lim, Gingrich, & Insel, 2001). 
There is further good evidence that the mesocorticolimbic pathways 
also mediate pair bonding in rodents (Insel & Young, 2000).  Prairie and pine 
voles form partner preferences and pair bonds after mating but montane and 
meadow voles do not form selective attachments. Thus it is of substantial 
interest that in prairie but not montane voles dopamine release in Nac is 
associated with mating (Gingrich, Liu, Cascio, Wang, & Insel, 2000) and that 
D2 receptor agonists infused into the Nac induce and antagonists prevent 
partner preferences (Wang et al., 1999). These, and numerous other, studies 
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support the notion that mesolimbic dopamine activation of D2 receptors is 
necessary and sufficient for the development of a partner preference (in 
prairie voles). Voles research also suggests the hypothesis that mating 
releases OT  and AVP which amplifies the dopamine signal in the Nac shell 
(Insel, 2003).  To this we might add more recent evidence that the ventral 
pallidum, located within the ventral forebrain and part of the mesolimbic 
dopamine reward pathway, shows high density of vasopressin V1a receptors 
(V1aRs) in the monogamous prairie and pine voles, but not in the 
promiscuous meadow or montane voles (Lim, Murphy, & Young, 2004).  Site-
specific infusion of a selective V1aR antagonist into the ventral pallidum 
blocks pair bond formation in prairie voles (Lim & Young, 2004). Thus, V1aRs 
in the ventral forebrain appear to be crucial for pair bond formation, and this 
V1aR pattern seems to be correlated with monogamous social organization.  
Experimental evidence supporting this hypothesis comes from a single gene 
manipulation study (Lim, Wang et al., 2004). Partner preference formation 
(measured as time spent huddling with partner as opposed to stranger vole) in 
the socially promiscuous meadow vole could be increased by using viral 
vector V1aR gene transfer into the ventral forebrain.  The overexpression of 
V1aR in the ventral pallidum leads to the development of partner preference 
in this interpersonally undiscriminating rodent. What we see here is a potential 
molecular mechanism for the rapid evolution of complex social behaviour and 
the possible recreation of a singular critical evolutionary event in the 
laboratory. 
Knowledge from preclinical (animal) models is confirmed by 
neuroimaging studies which demonstrate an association between functional 
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brain activity related to attachment and cortical and subcortical sites in the 
human brain that contain a high density of the neurohormones OT and AVP.  
Imaging shows that the mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic pathway is activated 
while processing attachment related stimuli. Strathearn (2002) studied the 
brain activation in mothers while viewing pictures of their own infants and 
compared this to the pattern of activation when they looked at infants who 
were familiar but not their own in three affective states (crying, smiling and 
neutral expressions).  He reported significant differences in the activation of 
the right globus pallidus/ventral striatum, the left putamen, the bed nucleus of 
the stria terminals, the nucleus accumbens, the amygdala, bilateral 
hippocampi,  and the fusiform face area (FFA). A very similar study (Nitschke 
et al., 2004) also reported activation in the orbitofrontal areas (OFC) in the 
mothers watching their own infants, which correlated with their hedonic mood 
state which was also measured in the study.  OFC activation is of course also 
observed in other studies in response to pleasant experiences: taste, smell, 
money, winning, positive feedback, nicotine, cocaine (Kawabata & Zeki, 
2004). The most compelling recent study comes from Bartels and Zeki (2004) 
who, using the contrast of own vs. other child controlled for age and 
familiarity, were able to demonstrate activity in the substantia nigra, globus 
pallidus, sub-thalamic nuclei, bed nucleus of the stria terminalis and the 
ventral tegmental area comprising almost all of the regions critical for the 
attachment-mediating neuropeptides in the human brain. As these workers 
had already reported an fMRI study of romantic love using a similar contrast 
design (Bartels & Zeki, 2000), they were able to confirm that most of the 
regions activated by maternal love were the same as those that they had 
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found to be associated with romantic love, i.e. those in the striatum (the 
putamen, globus pallidus, caudate nucleus), the middle insula and the dorsal 
part of the cingulate cortex. 
 In summary it has been established that mesocorticolimbic dopamine is 
an important candidate in the mediation of reward, the capacity for deferred 
gratification, and addiction, but is also critical for maternal behavior in rats and 
pair bonding in voles. A circuit linking a vasopressin sensitive mechanism 
within the anterior hypothalamus (MPOA) to the VTA and the nucleus 
accumbens shell may be especially important for mediating the rewarding 
properties of social interaction which are dysfunctional in BPD in line with their 
difficulties in forming normal attachments. The neuropeptides OT and AVP 
are released by socio-sexual experience in rodents and humans. When we 
activate this reward circuit a change in attachment behaviour follows (at least 
in voles). fMRI studies indicate activation of same pathways in response to 
stimuli relating to the participant’s own infant and partner.  We may conclude 
that a major neural system underpinning attachment has been identified. 
Dysfunctional interpersonal relatedness and a deficit in mentalisation   
Disturbed interpersonal relatedness has also been identified as a key 
aspect of BPD relative to other PDs (e.g. Skodol, Gunderson, McGlashan et 
al., 2002).  This can refer to a range of difficulties including dramatic shifts 
from idealization of to disillusionment with others, frantic efforts to avoid 
perceived abandonment, and inappropriate interpersonal aggression.  
However, an emerging literature suggests that all of these may share 
common mechanistic and etiologic features. Specifically, disorganized 
attachment in the relationships of individuals with BPD may mediate the 
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expression of interpersonal problems among individuals. Individuals with BPD 
have a model of relationships characterized by insecurity of attachment 
relative to other groups of Axis I or Axis II patients (e.g. Barone, 2003). On 
numerous measures of adult attachment, patients with BPD are identified as 
insecure, preoccupied and fearful in their relationships (e.g. Patrick, Hobson, 
Castle, Howard, & Maughan, 1994).  Patients with BPD have been 
characterized as having a specific type of disorganized, anxious-preoccupied 
attachment focused around an approach-avoidance dilemma where the 
attachment figure is simultaneously perceived as a source of threat and a 
secure base (Crandell et al., 2003). A variety of lines of research suggest that 
the disordered attachment that is characteristic of BPD results from 
psychosocial experiences of maltreatment (e.g. Trull, 2001) and premorbid 
temperamental attributes of negative affectivity and aggressive impulsivity 
(e.g. Silk, 2000). Surprisingly, while there is strong evidence for both the 
psychosocial mechanism (abnormal attachment) and psychosocial etiology 
(maltreatment) of interpersonal difficulties in BPD (e.g. Skodol, Siever et al., 
2002), a neurobiological account of disrupted interpersonal interactions 
remains elusive.  Explorations of the subscales of a self report measure of 
interpersonal relatedness identified two types of problems experienced by 
BPD patients: one group have difficulty in achieving closeness to others and 
another group feel extremely submissive, unable to state needs and avoiding 
conflict (Leihener et al., 2003). At least the problems of the first group may be 
related to a deficit of social cognition that makes accurate perception of the 
respective mental states of self and other and self-other differentiation difficult 
(Fonagy et al., 2000).  Deficits of this aspect of interpersonal perception have 
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been demonstrated in analogue studies using film clips (e.g. Arntz & Veen, 
2001), affect recognition and alexithymic symptoms (e.g. Sayar, Ebrinc, & Ak, 
2001) and narratives of childhood experience (Fonagy et al., 1996).   
A deficit of interpersonal awareness implies an underlying failure to 
distinguish clearly between one’s own and others’ mental states.  Some of the 
brain abnormalities identified in borderline patients are consistent with the 
suggestion that a failure of representation of self-states is a key dysfunction.  
Some evidence suggests that the anterior cingulate cortex plays a key role in 
mentalizing the self, at least in the domain of emotional states (Frith & Frith, 
2003). Lane has proposed more specifically that implicit self-representations 
(i.e., phenomenal self-awareness) can be localized to the dorsal anterior 
cingulate, whereas explicit self-representations (i.e., reflection) can be 
localized to the rostral anterior cingulate (Lane, 2000). Activation of the medial 
prefrontal cortex has been demonstrated in a series of neuroimaging studies 
in conjunction with a wide range of mentalization inferences, in both visual 
and verbal domains (Gallagher et al., 2000). It appears that the prefrontal 
cortex is involved when mentalizing interactively in a way that requires 
implicitly representing the mental states of others. The mesial prefrontal 
cortex, the parieto-temporal junction and the temporal poles constitute a 
network of areas that are invariably active when mentalizing activity is taking 
place (Gallagher & Frith, 2003).  The same area of the brain is involved in 
other tasks which have been clinically described as challenging to patients 
with borderline problems, including assessing social trustworthiness (Winston, 
Strange, O'Doherty, & Dolan, 2002), interpreting the meaning of facial 
expressions (Critchley et al., 2000), making moral judgements (Greene & 
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Haidt, 2002) and tasks that entail attending to one’s own emotions (Gusnard, 
Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001).  It has been argued that exposure to 
stress impairs prefrontal cortical function and the impairment may be 
catecholamine mediated (Arnsten, 1998).  In line with this suggestion is the 
observation that N-acetyl-aspartate (NAA), a marker of neural integrity, is 
lowered in the anterior cingulated region of the medial prefrontal cortex of 
maltreated children and adolescents (De Bellis, Keshavan, Spencer, & Hall, 
2000).   
The loose coupling of attachment and mentalisation 
So far we have described two systems where borderline functional deficits are 
evident, certainly at the behavioural level and, on preliminary neurobiological 
evidence, at the biological level.  First, the mesolimbic dopaminergic reward 
system underpinning attachment may be dysfunctional in BPD. This is 
suggested both by the poor ability of individuals with BPD to delay gratification 
and the evident disorganisation of their attachment system.  The overlapping 
neural underpinnings of these deficits might suggest that therapeutically 
addressing either set of issues may indirectly benefit the other.  Thus 
behavioural approaches, such as DBT, which begin by addressing the reward 
systems in general and impulsivity in particular, might, through such 
interventions also have an impact on the quality of functioning within the 
attachment system (although this was not part of the original aim of Dialectical 
Behavior Therapy).   Equally the possibility of a common deficit underpinning 
these two aspects of BPD dysfunction might explain the beneficial effects that 
improvements in attachment relationships might generate for problems of 
impulsivity or decision making.   
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Second, the mesial prefrontal cortex, the parieto-temporal junction and 
the temporal poles are related to the deficits in mentalisation in interpersonal 
interactions. The suggestion here is that a focus on mentalisation addresses 
some of the social cognitive dysfunctions that generate inappropriate 
behaviour in BPD, particularly suspiciousness, aggression, insensitivity to 
social situations and adequate capacity to focus attention on self states to a 
degree pertinent to the interaction.    
Attachment and mentalisation systems are probably not independent of 
each other but in subtle ways might be “loosely coupled”.  This suggestion is 
based on the finding that securely attached children are relatively precocious 
in the development of mentalisation (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, & Holder, 1997; 
Meins, Fernyhough, Russel, & Clark-Carter, 1998) and the quality of parental 
mentalisation of a child facilitates the development of secure attachment 
(Fonagy, Steele, Moran, Steele, & Higgitt, 1991).  More recently, the 
intersection of mentalisation capacity and social experience has been more 
generally noted (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004), although the specific nature of 
the interface remains controversial.   
Increased understanding of the neural mechanisms underpinning 
attachment may provide a further important clue. As previously mentioned, 
Bartels and Zeki (2000, 2004), in two separate studies, reported that maternal 
and romantic attachment appeared systematically to suppress brain activity in 
regions associated with emotionally charged memories, negative emotions, 
and those associated with mentalising and social judgements.  This suggests 
that strong emotional ties to an other (infant or partner) not only inhibit 
negative feelings but also impede the functioning of neural networks that 
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might assist in generating social judgements about the attachment figure.  
These ideas are extremely important and deserve consideration in some 
detail. 
The function of networks deactivated by the attachment system 
 While maternal and romantic love clearly serve different functions, they 
share a number of subjective and objective qualities such as preoccupation, 
deep concern, high level of commitment etc.  Underpinning this may be a 
common set of brain mechanisms that are activated when attachment feelings 
are powerfully triggered but also deactivation of a characteristic set of other 
neural functions. Bartels and Zeki (2004) suggest grouping these reciprocally 
active areas into two functional regions. The first (let us refer to it as system 
A) includes the middle prefrontal, inferior parietal and middle temporal cortices 
mainly in the right hemisphere, as well as the posterior cingulate cortex. 
These areas are specialised for attention and long-term memory (Cabeza & 
Nyberg, 2000), and have variable involvement in both positive (Maddock, 
1999) and negative (Mayberg et al., 1999) emotions. Their role in both 
cognition and emotion suggests that these areas may be specifically 
responsible for integrating emotion and cognition (e.g. emotional encoding of 
episodic memories Maddock, 1999).  In addition, studies of individuals with 
lesions in these areas suggest a role in judgements involving negative 
emotions (Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 2000). It is 
possible that as projections from the affect oriented limbic/paralimbic regions 
modulate the activity of these areas, they could sub-serve the ways mood can 
inhibit or enhance cognitive processing (Mayberg et al., 1999). Further, these 
areas may play a role in recalling emotion-related material and generating 
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emotion-related imagery  (Maddock, 1999) which may be relevant in relation 
to understanding the typology of attachment. 
 The second set of areas deactivated by the activation of the 
attachment system includes the temporal poles, parietotemporal junction, 
amygdala, and mesial prefrontal cortex (let us call this system B). Activation of 
these areas is consistently linked to negative affect, judgements of social 
trustworthiness, moral judgements, ‘theory of mind’ tasks, attention to one’s 
own emotions, and in particular, they constitute the primary neural network 
underlying our ability to identify mental states (both thoughts and feelings) in 
other people (Frith & Frith, 2003; Gallagher & Frith, 2003).  Mentalization 
pertains not just to states of mind in others but also reflecting on one’s own 
emotional and belief states and consequently such tasks appear to be 
associated with activation in the same neural system (Gusnard et al., 2001).  
Making judgements that involve mental states has been shown to be 
associated with activation of the same system.  Thus intuitive judgements of 
moral appropriateness (rather than moral reasoning) are linked (Greene & 
Haidt, 2002) as is assessment of social trustworthiness based on facial 
expression (Winston et al., 2002).   
If confirmed by further studies, the pattern of activation of these three 
systems (the attachment system, system A and system B) has important 
implications for our understanding of the nature of individual differences in 
attachment, the relationship of attachment and mentalisation and 
consequently our understanding of dysfunctions associated with BPD and the 
mechanisms underpinning its psychological treatment.  The activation of the 
attachment system, mediated by dopaminergic structures of the reward 
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system in the presence of oxytocin and vasopressin, inhibits neural systems 
that underpin the generation of negative affect (system A).  This is to be 
expected since a key function of the attachment system is to moderate 
negative affects in the infant and presumably later in development (Sroufe, 
1996).  The overwhelming negative affect associated with the loss of 
attachment figures, the need for attachment figures at times of sadness, and 
the hedonic effect of “finding love” are obvious common observations in line 
with these findings.  Not only is the loss of attachment likely to be aversive 
because of the loss of ‘reward’ (addiction) but also the prior inhibition of 
systems associated with the generation of negative affect is removed.   
Equally consistent with expectations, is the suppression of social and 
moral judgements (system B) associated with the activation of the attachment 
system.  Judgements of social trustworthiness and morality serve to distance 
us from others but become less relevant and may indeed interfere with our 
relationships with those to whom we are strongly attached (Belsky, 1999). 
Some implications of the reciprocal activation of mentalisation and attachment    
The apparently reciprocal relationship of mentalisation and attachment 
is puzzling as, at first sight, it appears to contradict some of the assumptions 
concerning the facilitative relationship between the two systems outlined 
above (viz. the assumption that mentalisation and attachment are positively 
correlatated).  Further scrutiny suggests a more complex relationship. First, 
the neural association between attachment and mentalisation confirms the 
link we have identified between the two systems at a behavioural level 
(Fonagy et al., 2002).  Second, we have demonstrated how the parent’s 
capacity to mentalise in the context of an attachment relationship facilitates 
 25 
the development of secure attachment in the infant (Fonagy et al., 1991).  It is 
possible, taking a sociobiological perpective, that the parent’s capacity to 
mentalise the infant or child serves to reduce the child’s experienced need to 
monitor the parent for trustworthiness.  The relaxation of the interpersonal 
barrier serves to facilitate the emergence of the attachment bond.  Third, we 
have seen that mentalization emerges precociously in children who were 
securely attached in infancy (e.g. Fonagy et al., 1997).  While at first sight this 
finding may seem inconsistent with the inverse relationship between 
attachment and mentalisation at brain level, if we consider the association 
developmentally, it is to be expected that in individuals whose attachment is 
secure, there are likely to be fewer calls over time for the activation of the 
attachment system. This in turn accounts for the precocious development of 
mentalisation.   
Fourth, we have consistently suggested that the capacity for 
mentalisation in the context of attachment was in some respects independent 
of the capacity to mentalise about interpersonal experiences independently of 
the attachment context (Fonagy et al., 2002).  We have found that our specific 
measure of mentalisation in the attachment context, reflective function 
(Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998) is predictive of behavioural 
outcomes that other measures of mentalisation did not correlate with.  For 
example, in a quasi-longitudinal study based on interviews and chart reviews 
with young adults some of whom had suffered trauma, we found that the 
impact of trauma on mentalisation in attachment contexts mediated outcome 
measured as the quality of adult romantic relationships but mentalisation 
measured independently of the attachment context using the Reading the 
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Mind in the Eyes test did not (Fonagy, Stein, Allen, & Fultz, 2003).  It seems 
that measuring mentalisation in the context of attachment measures a unique 
aspect of social behaviour.   
Mentalisation in the context of attachment and the classification of attachment 
types  
While, from an evolutionary perspective, mentalisation may be 
generally less relevant in an attachment context than in other social contexts, 
nevertheless it is quite likely that the ability to mentalize in the context of 
attachment relationships points to a highly desirable capacity. Individuals who 
are able to mentalize while thinking about romantic partners or infants are 
likely to manage these relationships better and may, for example, have less 
turbulent interpersonal relationships, or be perhaps particularly effective at 
times of inevitable conflict and argument.  This could be why secure 
attachment is marked by a relatively good capacity to mentalise and generate 
coherent narratives of even turbulent interpersonal episodes (Main, 2000).  
The simple empirical prediction that follows from these speculations is that 
individuals who are able to retain a relatively high activation of the temporal 
lobes, the parieto-temporal junction together with the mesial prefrontal cortex 
(system B) in the presence of the activation of the dopaminergic mesolimbic 
pathways (attachment and reward system) will be those most likely to be 
classified as secure in their attachment.   
A new understanding of the deficit in mentalisation in BPD 
We have arrived at a new understanding of the deficit of mentalisation 
entailed in borderline personality disorder.  We have observed that 
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mentalisation in individuals with BPD frequently represented a challenge 
described (inappropriately) in the psychoanalytic literature as a failure of 
symbolisation or concreteness of thinking (e.g. Grotstein, 1983).  Yet 
mentalisation in general does not appear to be a problem for most individuals 
with BPD; it is only in the context of intimate relationships that the patient’s 
capacity to depict mental states in others accurately appears to falter (Fonagy 
et al., 2002).   
One simple model that may account for this somewhat paradoxical 
observation is that the attachment system is “hypersensitive”, triggered too 
readily, and consequently the reciprocally deactivated systems are often 
inefficient (relatively deactivated) in their functioning. Two of the core 
symptoms of BPD, frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment and 
the characteristic pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships 
characterized by alternating between extremes of idealization and devaluation 
are perhaps directly linked to such hyperactivity or hypersensitivity 
(Gunderson, 2001).  A number of frequently noted observations made about 
individuals with BPD are consistent with this simple assumption. (1) 
Relationships of BPD individuals have a rapidly escalating tempo moving from 
acquaintance to great intimacy far faster than one might expect.  (2) 
Hyperactivity of the attachment system removes the system responsible for 
maintaining a normal emotional barrier between self and others and 
generates an impression of entangled and preoccupied relationships 
(Agrawal, Gunderson, Holmes, & Lyons-Ruth, 2004) and frequently, 
somewhat unwisely, removes the need to assess the social validity of the 
social partner. (3) The excessively positive character of the initial phase 
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relationships that individuals with BPD form (often labelled ‘idealization’) may 
reflect the suppression of negative relationship specific affects and the 
inability to integrate emotion and cognition. (4) Affective instability, particularly 
the characteristic intense brief episodes of dysphoria may be the result of 
some form of rebound phenomena related to the hypersensitive or 
hyperactive attachment system. Such rebound effects might also account for 
outbursts of violent anger and interpersonal suspiciousness (paranoia) which 
might reflect overactivity in  system B (Pickup & Frith, 2001).  (5) The 
reduction of the influence of affectively laden episodic memory may relate to 
the chronic feelings of emptiness often encountered by individuals with this 
diagnosis. 
 Of central concern to our theoretical and clinical propositions is the 
mentalisation deficit we have reported in these patients (Fonagy et al., 1996). 
While standing by our description of the mental processes that emerge as 
characteristic of the intentional stance of the individual with BPD, we would 
now like to specify the cause of this deficit. Previously, we have argued that 
the deficit was a self-induced one - a defensive reaction in vulnerable 
individuals when confronted with hostile states of mind in the context of 
interpersonal trauma. While much of the extant data still appears to us to fit 
with this model (e.g. the association of early neglect with BPD, the 
undermining of the development of symbolisation in the families of maltreated 
youngsters, the high prevalence of attachment trauma, the high prevalence of 
individuals who show no BPD symptoms following trauma), it seems highly 
likely that mentalisation deficit can be secondary to the abnormal functioning 
of the attachment system (i.e. its hyperactivity). The latter of course is likely to 
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be the consequence of developmentally early dysfunctions of the attachment 
system in combination with later traumatic experiences in an attachment 
context. We speculate that deficits of mentalisation might sometimes occur 
because the capacity to mentalise is taken off line by the activation of the 
attachment system.  Of course, this is not an ‘all or nothing affair’.  We 
assume that in these individuals, who are insecurely attached and therefore 
would not be able to maintain mentalisation normally in any case in the 
context of attachment relationships, the hyper-responsiveness of the 
attachment system, perhaps related to traumatic or other early experiences or 
genetic predisposition, has an unusually negative impact upon mentalising 
with the expected effects already described above. It remains probable that 
activating the capacity to mentalize in the context of attachment relationships 
generates substantial anxiety for traumatised individuals which in turn 
increases the activation of the attachment system in even those with an 
avoidant-dismissing pattern of attachment. Of course here we have a 
potentially extremely vicious cycle of heightened attachment, increasingly 
decoupled mentalisation, and increased vulnerability to further interpersonal 
trauma. A number of testable hypotheses follow from this model. Predictions 
from this model include: (1) mentalisation dysfunctions should be observable 
only when the attachment system is active; (2) mentalisation dysfunction 
should be associated with negative affect; (3) problems of accurate social and 
moral judgements should correlate with mentalisation capacity; (4) the degree 
of disorganisation of attachment relationships should correlate with the 
likelihood of mentalisation problems; (5) there are likely to be deficits 
associated with the retrieval of emotion laden memories when the attachment 
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system is active; (6) ambiguous stimuli (e.g. polysemous words with 
attachment and non-attachment meanings) will be more likely to trigger the 
attachment system of BPD individuals.  
Implications for therapy and the mechanisms of change 
How can this model of the nature of deficit in BPD serve to focus our 
work with borderline patients, or rather how do we understand the changes 
we observe given the current focus of our work which is to assist in the 
recovery of the capacity to accurately think about thoughts or feelings?  There 
is an important proviso to this aim.  MBT in a range of contexts attempts to 
enhance mentalisation but always in the context of an attachment 
relationship.  Both in individual and in group therapy the therapist through a 
range of largely unconscious techniques activates the attachment system.  
This occurs through a) the discussion of current attachment relationships, b) 
the discussion of past attachment relationships, c) through creating a safe and 
sensitive interpersonal environment that assists with the patient’s regulation of 
affect, the therapist encourages but regulates the patient’s attachment bond to 
the therapist, d) in the context of group therapy the therapist attempts to 
engender attachment bonds between members of the group.  At the same 
time, paradoxically, the therapist attempts to enhance mentalisation not just in 
the techniques defined in the therapy manual but perhaps more importantly 
and generically simply by taking an interest in the mental world of the patient.  
This creates what we now understand as a somewhat paradoxical situation in 
terms of brain activity insofar as psychological therapy simultaneously 
activates what may be two mutually inhibitory sets of systems.  There are two 
other ways in which this somewhat paradoxical pattern of activation is 
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maintained: a) the titrated activation of negative emotions as the therapist 
encourages the confrontation of adverse or traumatic experiences and b) the 
encouragement to retrieve affect-laden episodic memories.  In these ways the 
individual with BPD is encouraged to counteract the normal pattern of 
attachment related deactivation of mentalising negative emotions and social 
and moral judgements. 
We can see that overall MBT encourages the patient not to relinquish 
mentalisation at the slightest suggestion of attachment related brain 
activation.  This is likely to have an impact on the attachment system as well, 
since we have seen that mentalisation strengthens the development of secure 
patterns of attachment.  In other words, at the same time as strengthening 
mentalisation we speculate that MBT moves the pattern of arousal within 
these systems closer to that characteristic of a secure attachment.  Evidently, 
to achieve this the therapist must be careful to balance the intensity of 
attachment relationships and the complexity of mentalisation required of the 
patient.  The technical recommendation in MBT is to focus the patient’s 
mentalisation on relationships with relatively low levels of involvement and 
only gradually to focus the patient’s thinking on relationships closer to the 
patient’s core self.  Similarly the tasks of mentalisation vary in demand 
characteristics with clarification at the most superficial end and exploring of 
repudiated intense emotions in relation to the attachment figure at the more 
complex end.  The therapist’s aim is to reduce the likelihood of an anxious 
catastrophic response to the introduction of needing to think about the states 
of mind of attachment figures.   
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Thus using this model may help us to differentiate it from alternative 
therapeutic packages.  While such distinctions are never more than 
caricatures, nevertheless they do point to important differences in technique 
between therapeutic approaches which are probably broadly equivalent in 
terms of achieving substantial therapeutic change.  Thus aspects of DBT 
clearly also focus on the enhancing of mentalisation, e.g. the encouragement 
of mindfulness.  However, this rarely occurs in the context of requiring 
individuals to conceptualise mental states in the context of attachment 
relationships.  By contrast, supportive psychotherapy is less specifically 
focused on mental states but probably attempts to reduce the hypersensitivity 
of the attachment system of an individual who suffered severe attachment 
trauma.  Transference focused psychotherapy is perhaps closest to MBT in its 
orientation to mental states in attachment contexts, the difference being a far 
more limited emphasis on the titration of interventions.  The observations 
reported by Levy, Clarkin and Kernberg (Levy & Clarkin, in press) are 
consistent with the propositions here: attachment related mentalisation 
(reflective function) improves only in TFP and not in DBT or supportive 
psychotherapy. 
Implications for the general process of change in therapy 
The therapeutic process we have described in relation to MBT with 
BPD is probably not specific to either this approach or to this patient group. A 
strong case can be made that all forms of psychotherapy take some 
advantage of the simultaneous activation of these normally mutually inhibitory 
systems. It is possible that psychotherapy in general works because it 
arouses the attachment system at the same time as applying interpersonal 
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demands (psychotherapy technique) which require the patient to mentalise, to 
confront and experience negative affect and confront and review issues of 
morality (superego). Why might this be helpful? We speculate that thinking 
about feelings, thoughts and beliefs in the context of attachment is helpful 
because in this ‘paradoxical’ brain state there may be more access to 
modifying preset ways of conceptualising the contents of one’s own and 
other’s minds, as well as issues of morality and social judgement. Activating 
the attachment system harnesses brain biology partially to remove the 
dominance of constraints on the present from the past (long-term memory) 
and creates the possibility of re-thinking, re-configuring intersubjective 
relationship networks. The specific advantage of MBT in this process may be 
its focus on the simultaneous activation of the attachment system whilst 
encouraging development of psychological processes that are normally 
inhibited as a result. To this extent MBT represents a confluence of biology 
and psychology and goes some way towards meeting Kazdin’s edict that an 
understanding of the processes underpinning psychopathology should inform 
treatment innovation. 
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